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Cyber warfare for it is a new concept in the conduct of war and is thus not properly 
understood hence considered a grey area with inadequate legislation. This dissertation 
seeks to bring to light the emergence and steady growth of cyber warfare as a method of 
war and to emphasize on the pressing need to regulate such wars. War is inevitable and 
many States are adopting this method of war because it harbors many benefits for the 
perpetrators who at first instance have their identity sealed and this enables them to 
escape liability for such actions. International Humanitarian Law is presently the legal 
basis through which cyber warfare is regulated. This paper offers an in-depth 
understanding of the ‘law of war’ vis-à-vis Cyber warfare. It seeks to examine the 
principles, philosophies, scope, laws, policies, rules and the rationale of International 
Humanitarian Law as a foundational basis to its applicability to Cyber warfare. It also 
looks into the manifestations of cyber warfare in the recent past and present as well as 
other institutional and regulatory influences in this field such as the Tallinn Manual 
which further provides that there are no treaty provisions directly addressing cyber 
warfare and although International law may also derive from custom, it is difficult to 
establish given the novelty of the field whether there is always enough available material 
and practice to draw conclusions of customary law from. This dissertation also offers 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background 
The advancement of technology over the recent years has given rise to new and 
unconventional means and methods of warfare. Examples of these ‘new technologies’ 
include but are not limited to; drones, automated weapon systems, nanotechnology 
weapons and cyber warfare1. Not only is there presently, fighting capabilities on land and 
at sea, but also in cyberspace.2 
Cyber warfare is the conduct of military operations on a virtual realm against or via a 
computer or computer system through a data stream. 3The Tallin manual refines the 
definition of Cyber warfare as including cyber attacks and cyber operations further 
stating that a cyber operation is a sufficient basis for a claim of cyber warfare4. The ICRC 
defines it as any hostile measures against an enemy designed to discover, alter, destroy, 
disrupt or transfer data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer or transmitted 
through a computer5. It consists of nation-states using cyberspace to achieve essentially 
the same ends they would pursue through military force. These ends include achieving 
advantages over a competing nation-state or preventing a competing nation-state from 
achieving advantages over them. 6This form of military conflict exists in information 
warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks.7Such 
operations can aim to do different things, for instance to infiltrate a system and collect, 
export, destroy, change, or encrypt data or to trigger, alter or otherwise manipulate 
processes controlled by the infiltrated computer system. By these means, a variety of 
‘targets’ in the real world can be destroyed, altered or disrupted, such as industries, 
                                                     
1ICRC, ‘New Technologies and Warfare’ International Review of the Red Cross, 2012. 
2 US Department  of Defense, ‘US Cyber Command Fact Sheet’, US Department of Defense Office of 
Public Affairs, 25 May, 2010 
3Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' International Review of the Red Cross, 
2012, 94(886), 517. 
4Tallin Manual 2017 
5International Committee of the Red Cross, No Legal Vacuum in Cyber Space, Aug. 16, 2011 
6 Susan Bremner, Cyberthreats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009, p. 65. 
7 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 110th Congress, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2007, p. 22, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html  
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infrastructures, telecommunications, or financial systems.8 
Cyber operations enable enemy states to commit acts of war without mobilizing their 
armies. The objectives of cyber-attacks are more inclined towards sabotage and 
espionage rather than to armed conflict.
9
Although occurring in a virtual space, the effects 
may felt in reality. For instance, the Stuxnet virus10altered the operating conditions for 
the Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges, which ultimately resulted in physical damage 
to those centrifuges.11 
The tools and techniques of conflict in cyberspace can be separated into tools based on 
technology and techniques focusing on human beings. Each type is further classified as 
offensive or defensive tools and techniques12. Offensive tools and techniques allow a 
hostile party to do something undesirable. Defensive tools and techniques seek to prevent 
a hostile party from doing so.  
An offensive technology based tool requires three components namely: Access, 
vulnerability and payload13. Access refers to how the hostile party gets at the Information 
Technology of interest. The access may be remote or may require proximity to the Source 
of Information. Vulnerability is the ‘weak point’ from which the system can be infiltrated 
mostly due to the lack of adequate security in the system. The payload is the mechanism 
for affecting the System after access has been used and vulnerability has been taken 
advantage of.14For example, if a virus has entered a computer it’s payload may be the 
fact that the system can now be used to re-program data or destroy it altogether. 
Examples of defensive tools used in technology based include firewalls, which close off 
                                                     
8Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' 518. 
9 William Jackson, ‘Cyber attacks in the present tense, Estonian says’, in Government Computing News, 28 
November 2007, available at http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/45476-1.html. 
10 A computer worm believed to have been built jointly by American and Israel and is classified as a cyber-
weapon. The worm specifically targets programmable Logic controllers. 
11 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 29, p. 36–
37.   
12 Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' (2012) 94(886) International Review of 
the Red Cross 
13Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' (2012) 94(886) International Review of 
the Red Cross, 517. 
14Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' (2012) 94(886) International Review of 
the Red Cross, 517. 
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routes used to access the information, or other programs that identify intruder activity. 
Offensive people based techniques arise when an inside person is blackmailed, tricked or 
bribed into allowing the hostile party access the information through purely technological 
means.15For example, by bribing a programmer to re-write a defective code. There still 
exists a technological approach in this setup, since the attack is occurring on a virtual 
realm. Defensive people-based techniques essentially involve retaliation to acts that 
compromise the security of the state. 
The most common actors are known to be States having potent offensive cyber 
capabilities. The main perpetrators of cyber exploitation and cyber-attack are sub-
national parties who are mostly individuals, and mostly for profit as well as terrorist 
groups.16The reasons for cyber warfare include but are not limited to, personal reasons, 
military, political and financial reasons.17. This is because a large form of commerce 
these days is conducted via the internet and a lot of valuable information is currently 
accessible online18, especially after the advent of the Cloud, for instance, trade secrets, 
credit card information, negotiation strategies and contracts to name but a few. Another 
loftier reason for conducting such attacks is political advantage. The perpetrators may 
conduct cyber exploitations and attacks in order to send messages to the adversary, to 
gather intelligence for National purposes, to persuade or influence another party to 
behave in a certain manner or to dissuade the opponent. 19 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
International humanitarian law, also known as the law of war, is a set of rules, which 
seek, for humanitarian reasons,to limit the effects of armed conflict. 20 In as much as 
Cyber warfare is a type of war and can occur between states, in some instances, it does 
not amount to armed conflict. IHL is presently the legal basis through which cyber 
warfare is regulated. Cyber warfare is presumed to be the war of the future as a result of 
digital migration due to the advancement of technology. For this reason it is imperative 
                                                     
15 Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' 518.  
16Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' 519. 
17Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' 520. 
18 https://www.peterindia.net/E-businessOverview.html 
19Herbert Lin, 'Cyber conflict and international humanitarian law' 520. 
20 Advisory service on International Humanitarian Law, ICRC July 2004 




that Cyber warfare is adequately regulated in order to ensure future warfare is 
controlled.In the US, some public policy experts have declared the proximity of cyber 
warfare is and acknowledge the need for other nations to respond to this threat opting for 
a call to action‘reminiscent of the cold war era’.21 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1. To identify an ideal the regulatory approach to Cyber warfare. 
2. To confer an understanding the relationship between International Humanitarian 
law and Cyber warfare 
3. To identify other regulatory approaches to Cyber warfare 
1.4 Research questions 
1. What is the most suitable approach to take in the effective regulation of Cyber 
warfare? 
2. Is IHL a sufficient regulatory approach to Cyber warfare? 
3. What other Laws inform the regulation of Cyber warfare? 
1.5 Justification and Scope of Study 
This paper seeks to bring to light the emergence and steady growth of cyber warfare as a 
method of war and to emphasize on the pressing need to regulate such wars. War is 
inevitable and many States are adopting this method of war because it harbors many 
benefits for the perpetrators who at first instance have their identity sealed and this 
enables them to escape liability for such actions. Secondly, Digital migration is a reality 
as well as a double-edged sword. This is because advancement in technology is 
unavoidable and in many cases viewed as a tool for economic development vis a vis the 
negative intention and effects of Cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is a contemporary means 
of warfare and is said to be ‘the war of the future’ and undeniably thus prevention is 
                                                     
21  David Ignatius, Pentagon’s cybersecurity plans have a Cold War chill, Wahington Post( August 
26,20010) at A13. 
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better than cure. This study shall adopt an international scope because Cyber attacks and 
espionage are often conducted inter-state and the popularity of this new method of 
warfare is bound to gain even more popularity internationally. 
1.6 Hypothesis 
Cyber warfare is predestinedwar that falls beyond the scope of International 
Humanitarian Law. 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
This study employs Sociological jurisprudence school of thoughtwith the main proponent 
being Roscoe Pound. 
The Sociological theory focuses more on the ways laws develop in society rather than an 
analysis of legal texts. This is premised on the fact that the law has become an end in 
itself and without taking the social effects into consideration. Roscoe Pound stated ‘in the 
past, we studied the law from within. The Jurists of today are studying Law from 
without’ 22 The approach he identified as vitalto the question of sociological 
jurisprudence.Sociological Jurisprudence according to Roscoe Pound is a means of 
making legal rules effective, as well as studying the actual/real effects of the legal 
institutions and doctrines, sociological studies of the preparation of legislation 
particularly comparative legislation, sociological legal historyconsidering effects of legal 
doctrines that existed in the past, advocacy of reasonable and just solutions of legal cases 
and making effort more effective in achieving the purpose of law.23 Pound classifies legal 
interests into three categories namely; Individual, Public and Social. He defines 
Individual interests as ‘claims or demands or desires involved immediately in the 
individual’s life and asserted in the title of that life’.24 He defines Public Interests as 
‘claims or demands or desires involved in the life of a politically organized society and 
are asserted in title of that organization. They are commonly treated as the claims of a 
politically organized society thought of as a legal entity’.25 He further defined Social 
                                                     
22 Roscoe Pound, The spirit of the Common Law, Boston: Beacon press (1921) p 212. 
23 Roscoe Pound , The Scope and purpose of sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Havard Law Review (1912) p 
514- 516. 
24 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests 57 Havard Law Review 99 (1943)p 1-2. 




interests as ‘Claims or Demands or desires involved in the social life in civilized society 
and asserted in title of that life’26 These three interests are balanced out against each other 
which is the aim of social jurisprudence. Pound framed some assumptions referred to as 
‘Jural postulates’, which he claims need not be tested against morality, as they are self 
sufficient and fit in with the functions of Law. This theory is based on the assumption 
that the interests sought by society are generally good. 
 
1.7    Literature Review 
Cyberspace is referred to as ‘‘not a ‘law-free’ zone where anyone can conduct hostile 
activities without rules or restraint” but which, in some circumstances, may be regulated 
by the law of armed conflict.27 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
steadfastly argued that many of the same principles that regulate battlefield combat also 
apply in cyberspace 28 ,which David Éricsimplifies as :do not attack non-combatants, 
attack combatants only by legal means, treat persons in your power humanely, and 
protect the victims.29 
 A humanitarian ambition ought to be the Protection of victims by giving them 
infrastructure indispensable for survival, and setting up monitoring bodies. 30Scholars 
biased to the notion that International law is the only avenue of dealing with the problem 
of Cyber warfare offer that it is difficult to fit cyber problems into the rules on 
international law with respect to the use of force.31 
 Dinstein and Michael Schmitt32 advocate for new interpretations of the rules on 
the use of force in order to have the right to respond to cyber problems with military 
force instead of looking at other international rules, such as those on non-intervention, 
countermeasures, economic law, and the like.  
                                                     
26 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests 57 Havard Law Review 99 (1943)p 1-2. 
27Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, OpinioJuris, September 19, 2012 
28International Committee of the Red Cross, Cyber Warfare, Oct. 10, 2010 
29David Éric, Principes de droit des conflitsarmés, Brussels, Bruylant,Edition 3, (2002), p 921-922.  
30 Maurice Frederic, ‘Humanitarian ambition’ IRRC, Vol.289,(1992) p 371. 
31Y Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’ (2002) 76 Intl Law Studies 99. 
32MN Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework’ (1999) 37 Colum J Transnatl L 885 
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 On the contrary, scholars such as Noah Schachtmanargue that the threat of cyber-
attacks has been blown out of proportion to the detriment of preventing the real 
challenges to cyber security: cybercrime and espionage.33The objectives of cyber-attacks 
are more inclined towards sabotage and espionage rather than to armed conflict. 34   
However cyber attacks may in certain situations amount to the use of force within the 
meaning of article 2(4) of the UN Charter35 if the cyber attack proximately results in 
death, injury or significant destruction36 
 
1.8   Design Methodology 
 
This study seeks to use is conducted via qualitative research and analysis in dealing with 
the subject matter, a considerable emphasis on the history and literature on International 
Humanitarian Law and a comparative analysis of International Human Rights Laws with 
Cyber warfare. The Desk search shall constitute review of IHL statutes such as the 
Geneva Conventions I-IV, the Rome Statute commonly referred to as the Geneva Laws 
and Hague Laws respectively. The study shall make use of books, journal articles, 
conference papers and online journals as secondary sources. 
 
1.9   Limitations 
 
The concept of Cyber warfare is new in International Law and is seen as ambiguous or as 
a phenomenon. There is thus not enough literature on the subject matte 
The Research design methodology chosen does not incorporate collection of primary data 
on the subject matter and is heavily reliant on desk research and secondary data. This 
affects the reliability of the research. 
 
                                                     
33P Singer and N Schachtman, ‘The Wrong War: The Insistence on Applying Cold War Metaphors to 
Cybersecurity is Misplaced and Counterproductive’ Brookings Institution (15 August 2011)  
34 William Jackson, ‘Cyber attacks in the present tense, Estonian says’, in Government Computing News, 
28 November 2007, available at http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/45476-1.html. 
35 Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, OpinioJuris, September 19, 2012 
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/  
36Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, Opinio Juris, September 19, 2012 




1.10  Chapter Breakdown 
 
Chapter 1 
Offers an introduction to the study as well as background information on the subject 
matter. This chapter provides the initial interaction with the concept of cyber warfare. 
This Chapter also delineates the scope of the study and the theoretical and practical basis 
through which the research is conducted. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter will offer an in depth understanding of International Humanitarian Law 
through examining the principles, philosophies and scope  
Chapter 3 
This Chapter shall analyze the ways in which Cyber warfare has been manifested 
internationally in the contemporary world.  
Chapter 4 
This chapter will also look into other laws that influence the regulation of cyber warfare. 
Chapter 5 










CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW& CYBER WARFARE 
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2.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter confers an in-depth understanding of the law of war vis-à-vis Cyber warfare. 
It seeks to examine the principles, philosophies, scope, laws, policies, rules and the 
rationale of International Humanitarian Law as a foundational basis to its applicability to 
Cyber warfare.  
 
2.2   What is International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules, which seek for humanitarian 
reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. 37 It regulates States, International 
organizations and other subjects of International Law.38 It aims to protect the rights of 
people who no longer directly take part in hostilities and restrict the means and methods 
of warfare.39 
 
International Humanitarian Law has two branches namely: The Laws of Geneva and the 
Laws of The Hague.40 The Laws of Geneva protects victims of armed conflict such as 
military personnel who are hors de combats and civilians who are no longer directly 
participating in hostilities41. The Laws of The Hague are a body of rules establishing the 
rights and obligations of belligerents in the conduct of hostilities and which limits means 
and methods of warfare. 42 IHL is a compromise between two underlying principles: 
military necessity and humanity.43  Military necessity permits only that degree and kind 
of force required achieving the legitimate purpose of a conflict. 44  The principle of 
humanity forbids the infliction of all suffering, injury or destruction not necessary for 
achieving the legitimate purpose of conflict. 
 
                                                     
37www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf  
38 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 1.  
39www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf  
40 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 5. 
41 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 5. 
42 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 5. 
43www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf  
 




States developed IHL mainly through the adoption of treaties and the formation of 
customary Law. Customary law is formed when State practice is sufficiently widespread, 
representative, frequent and uniform and accompanied by a belief among States that they 
are legally bound to act or prohibited from acting in certain ways.45 The International 
Court of Justice stated in the Continental Shelf case stated “It is of course axiomatic that 
the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opiniojuris of States 46 that is in State practice and belief that the state 
practice is required as a general practice accepted by law47 
 
An armed conflict arises where there is a resort to armed force between states.48IHL 
applies only in situations of armed conflict: international and non-international armed 
conflict situations. International armed conflict occurs when one State resorts to war 
against another49The rues on IAC’s apply to all situations of armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High contracting Parties usually states, even if the state 
of war is not recognized by one of them.50As per common article 3, non- international 
armed conflict occurs when hostilities are taking part between the armed forces of state 
and organized non-state armed groups or between such groups.51 
 
2.3   WHO does IHL protect? 
 
IHL protects victims of armed conflict who are often civilians and combatants who have 
laid down their arms52. Combatants are all members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict, save for medical and religious personnel53. Civilians are defined as persons who 
                                                     
45 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 7. 
46ICJ, Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 
1985, pp. 29–30, § 27. 
47Article 38(1)(b), ICJ Statute 
48Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY (Case no. 211) part A para.70 
49 Article 1, Additional Protocol 1 
50 Article 2(1), Geneva Convention I-IV  
51 Article 1, Additional protocol 1  
52 Article 3, Geneva Convention I-IV 
53 Rule 3, ICRC Customary IHL Rules, ihldatabases@icrc.org 
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are not combatants.54 The nature of the protection IHL provides varies and is determined 
by whether the person in question is a combatant or a civilian. Civilians are entitled to 
protection so long as they do not take up arms and participate in hostilities while 
Combatants are protected for as long as they lay down their arms. 55  Civilians are 
‘protected persons’ under IHL when in the hands of a party to the conflict provided that 
they are not nationals of the enemy state56, they are not nationals of an ally of the enemy 
state57 they are not nationals of a neutral state58. The aim of IHL is to protect civilians 
from arbitrary acts of an adverse party because of their allegiance to its enemy. IHL 
prohibits indiscriminate attacks. 59  Protected civilians are entitled to respect of their 
dignity.60Maurice Frederic in his book Humanitarian Ambition wrote: 
 
‘Protecting victims means giving them a status, goods and the infrastructure 
indispensable for survival, and setting up monitoring bodies. In other words the idea is to 
persuade belligerents to accept an exceptional legal order – the law of war or 
humanitarian law – specially tailored to such situations. That is precisely why 
humanitarian action is inconceivable without close and permanent dialogue with the 
parties to the conflict. ‘61 
 
2.4   Principles of IHL 
IHL is governed by certain principles and rules. These include: Distinction between 
civilians and combatants, proportionality, precautions, prohibition against causing 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, prohibition to attack hors de combatand the 
principle of necessity. Eric David in the Principles De Droit De ConflitsArmesstated: 
 
                                                     
54 Rule 5, ICRC Customary IHL Rules, ihldatabases@icrc.org 
55 Rule 3, ICRC Customary IHL Rules, ihldatabases@icrc.org 
56 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 27. 
57 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 27. 
58 International Humanitarian law, ‘Answers to your questions’ (2014), 27. 
59 Rule 11, ICRC Customary IHL Rules, ihldatabases@icrc.org 
60 Article 5, Geneva Convention IV 




‘The law of armed conflicts is characterized by both simplicity and complexity – 
simplicity to the extent that its essence can be encapsulated in a few principles and set 
out in a few sentences, and complexity to the extent that one and the same act is governed 
by rules that vary depending on the context, the relevant instruments and the legal issues 
concerned. [...] The law of armed conflicts – as we have stated repeatedly – is simple  
law: with a little common sense and a degree of clear-sightedness, anyone can grasp its 
basic tenets for himself without being a legal expert. To put things as simply as possible, 
these rules can be summed up in four precepts: do not attack non-combatants, attack 
combatants only by legal means, treat persons in your power humanely, and protect the 
victims. [...] At the same time, the law of armed conflicts is complex since it does apply 
only in certain situations, those situations are not always easily definable in concrete 
terms and, depending on the situation, one and the same act can be lawful or unlawful, 
not merely unlawful but a criminal offence, or neither lawful nor unlawful!  62 
 
 
2.4.1 Distinction between Civilians and Combatants 
 
Distinction is a key principle under international Humanitarian Law.Military objectives 
are those objects which “by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.63 
 
Thus, at a minimum, hospitals and medical units are to be afforded those protections 
accorded civilian objects and protected from attack, unless they satisfy the definition of 
military objective above. Similarly, medical personnel are protected from attack, 
provided they do not directly participate in hostilities. 
 
                                                     
62David Éric, Principes de droit des conflits armés, Brussels, Bruylant,Edition 3, (2002), p 921-922.  
63 Article 52(2), Additional Protocol I 
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Parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilian objects and military 
objectives, and between civilians and combatants.64 Operations may be directed only 
against military objectives and combatants and never to civilian objects or civilians.65 
Civilians lose their protection from attack if they directly participate in hostilities66 or if 
they are being used to perform acts harmful to the enemy.67 
 
In case of doubt, as to whether an individual is a civilian, “that person shall be considered 
to be a civilian.”68 In case of doubt as to whether an object that is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military, that civilian 
object “shall be presumed” to be civilian and not to be making such an effective 
contribution.69 The parties to the armed conflict “must take all feasible precautions to 
protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects 
of attacks.”70 The parties to the armed conflict “must, to the extent feasible, remove 
civilian persons and objects under its control from the vicinity of military objectives.”71 
The presence of civilians shall not be used to render immune from attack military 
objectives. Similarly, the parties to a conflict shall not direct civilians to move or 
congregate in such a manner as to shield military objectives from attack.72 It is important 
to note that a violation of one of these rules by one party to the conflict does not release 
the opposing party to the conflict from their legal obligations vis-à-vis the protections 
owed civilians and civilian objects.73 
 
 
2.4.2 The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks 
Attacks that are indiscriminate in nature are prohibited.74  Indiscriminate attacks are 
                                                     
64art. 48, Additional Protocol I; Rules 1, 7, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study 
65art. 48, Additional Protocol I; Rules 1, 7, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study 
66Art. 51, First Additional Protocol 
67Rule 10, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study. 
68 Article 50 Additional Protocol I 
69 Article 52, Additional protocol I 
70 Article 51, Additional protocol I 
71 Rule 24, ICRC Customary IHL Rules, ihldatabases@icrc.org 
72 Article 51 , Additional Protocol I 
73 Article 51 Additional Protocol I 
74Article 51, Additional Protocol I. 
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 (a) which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
 (b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
 specific military objective; or 
 (c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
 limited as required by IHL, and are thus of a nature to strike military objectives 
 and civilian or civilian objectives without distinction.75 
 
2.4.3 The principle of proportionality 
The principle of proportionality prohibits the launching of an attack that “may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.” 76  Each party to the conflict is must do 
everything feasible to assess and ensure proportionality.77Prior to targeting a military 
object, if damage to civilian objects or civilian death or injury is anticipated, then an 
assessment must be undertaken in which the anticipated military advantage to be gained 
is weighed against the “collateral” damage to protected civilians or civilian objects that is 
anticipated.Thus, under IHL not every attack that results in civilian death or injury, or the 
destruction of a civilian object, is prohibited. Whether a strike was legal depends in part 
on whether the principle of proportionality was respected when the operation targeting 
the military objective was carried out. 
 
 
2.5   Rationale of IHL as the Legal regulator of Cyber warfare. 
 
IHL is commonly referred to as the Law of War. Attacks are defined in Article 49(1) of 
Additional Protocol I (which reflects customary IHL) as ‘acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defense’. Cyberspace is referred to as ‘‘not a ‘law-
                                                     
75 Article 51 Additional Protocol I 
76Rule 14, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study 
77Rule 18, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study. 
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free’ zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint” but 
which, in some circumstances, may be regulated by the law of armed conflict. 78The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has steadfastly argued that many of the 
same principles that regulate battlefield combat also apply in cyberspace79 
 
Moreover, cyber attacks may in certain situations amount to the use of force within the 
meaning of article 2(4) of the UN Charter80 if the cyber-attack proximately results in 















3. CHAPTER 3: MANIFESTATIONS OF CYBER WARFARE 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION: 
 
                                                     
78Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, Opinio Juris, September 19, 2012 
79International Committee of the Red Cross, Cyber Warfare, Oct. 10, 2010 
80Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, Opinio Juris, September 19, 2012 
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/  
81Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, Opinio Juris, September 19, 2012 
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/  
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This Chapter shall analyze the ways in which Cyber warfare has been manifested 
internationally through the investigations of major cyber-attacks namely: Estonia, Stutnex 
that have occurred in the past decade and look into the approaches different States have 





Disparities between Russia and Estonia arose in April 2002 when Estonia relocated the 
bronze soldier of Tallinn, a soviet-era war monument from the center of Tallinn. As a 
result a demonstrationwas carried out among Estonians of Russian descent who 
considered this monument as a symbol of honor to the Red army who fought against 
German Nazis. However, the non-Russian Estonian’s viewed the monument as a foreign 
symbol and a disregard for their sovereignty and thus made yearly protests for its removal 
from Tallin. During protest by Estonian’s of Russian origin, who viewed statue as a 
symbol of their right to be in Estonia, around 1300 people were arrested, 150 were 
injured, and one person killed. This incident also raged anger all across Russia and 
Russian computer experts turned to computer to attack Estonian’s IT 
infrastructureEstonia was heavily dependent on IT services and thus this was a huge 
setback for the State. According to the CERT Estonia, 98% of banking transactions are 
done electronically, 66% population uses the internet, 55% households have computer at 
home, and 91% computers are connected to the internet.83Thus started the fifth dimension 
of ‘cyber wars’ besides the conventional mediums of air, ground, sea and space wars. 
Estonia implicated the Russian government for the attacks but Kremlin denied any type 
of involvement. Estonia has e-government also known as paperless government and even 
the parliament is elected over the Internet. Being highly dependent on electronic services, 
such a cyber attack against the country’s IT systems can be catastrophic. Main targets of 
the attacks were: Estonian’s Presidency and Parliament;  G overnm ent M inistries 
 ;Political Parties   ; Famous news organizations   ; Banks  and C om m unication 
                                                     
82  Muhammed Saleem ,’Cyber warfare the truth in a real 
case’,https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b0aa/b027865f06f359e23d70a6826042403bc5e9.pdf 
83“Facts about Estonia”, CERT Estonia, May 10, 2008 http://www.ria.ee/27525 
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infrastructure.84According to BBC 85these were series of attacks carried out as a protest 
to deface government and other important websites. The famous British newspaper 
Telegraphy reported  
“Estonia has been hit by a prolonged series of ‘cyber attacks’ that disrupted leading 






                                                     
 
85 “The cyber Raiders hitting Estonia”, Thursday 17, 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm  
 
86“Cyber Attack, Hit Estonia”, May 18, 2007 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1551851/Cyber-













Stuxnet was originally detected in early 2010 by a computer security company in Belarus, 
and subsequently found to have infected (albeit without causing much actual harm) 
thousands of industrial control systems world- wide.90 
What has been discovered is that the Stuxnet virus is malware that attacks widely used 
industrial control systems built by the German firm, Siemens AG. The company says the 
malware was initially distributed via an infected USB thumb drive memory device or 
devices, exploiting vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows operating system. Such 
systems are used to monitor automated plants - from food and chemical facilities to 
power generators. Analysts said attackers may have chosen to spread the malicious 
software via a thumb drive because many SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
                                                     
88https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b0aa/b027865f06f359e23d70a6826042403bc5e9.pdf 
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90 Duncan Holis, Could Deploying Stuxnet be a War Crime? Opinio Juris (Jan 25, 2011),  
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Acquisition) systems are not connected to the Internet, but do have USB ports. Once the 
worm infects a system, it quickly sets up communications with a remote server computer 
that can be used to steal proprietary corporate data or take control of the SCADA system, 
said Randy Abrams, a researcher with ESET, a privately held security firm that has 
studied Stuxnet.91 
As of September 25, 2010, Iran had identified “the IP addresses of 30,000 industrial 
computer systems” that had been infected by Stuxnet. According to Mahmoud Liaii, 
director of the Information Technology Council of Iran’s Industries and Mines Ministry, 
the virus “is designed to transfer data about production lines from our industrial plants” to 
locations outside of Iran.92By 2011, it was still is not clear whether or if the attacks were 
over: Some experts examined the code and believe it contains the seeds for yet more 
versions and assaults.93 
 
According to Symantec, Stuxnet targets specific frequency-converter drives — power 
supplies used to control the speed of a device, such as a motor. The malware intercepts 
commands sent to the drives from the Siemens SCADA software, and replaces them with 
malicious commands to control the speed of a device, varying it wildly, but 
intermittently. The malware, however, doesn’t sabotage just any frequency converter. It 
inventories a plant’s network and only springs to life if the plant has at least 33 frequency 
converter drives made by FararoPaya in Teheran, Iran, or by the Finland-based Vacon. 
Even more specifically, Stuxnet targets only frequency drives from these two companies 
that are running at high speeds — between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz. Such high speeds are 
used only for select applications. Symantec is careful not to say definitively that Stuxnet 
was targeting a nuclear facility, but notes that “frequency converter drives that output 
over 600 Hz are regulated for export in the United States by the Nuclear Regulatory 
                                                     
91 Factbox: What is Stuxnet? Reuters (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/24/us-
security-cyber-iran-fb idUSTRE68N3PT20100924. 
92 Kerr, et al., supra note 6, at 3 (translated from Iran Confirms Cyber Attack, Says Engineers ‘Rooting 
Out’ Problem, Mehr News Agency, (September 25, 2010)). 
93 William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran 





Commission as they can be used for uranium enrichment.”94 
 
Stuxnet is very specific about what it does once it finds its target facility. It accesses a 
vulnerable system and manipulates it. Once Stuxnet determines it has infected the 
targeted system or systems, it begins intercepting commands to the frequency drives, 
altering their operation and according to Symantec Company’s Eric Chien other 
parameter changes may also cause unexpected effects.” 
 
 
“It is about destroying its targets with utmost determination in military style.”95 
 
Fig. 1 List of recent International Cyber attacks96  
                                                     
94 Kim Zetter, Clues Suggest Stuxnet Virus Was Built for Subtle Nuclear Sabotage, Threat Level (Nov. 15, 
2010)  
 
95 Broad, et al., supra note 14. 
 
96Tallin manual Final report (2013). 
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CHAPTER 4:  OTHER LAWS AND APPROACHES TO CYBER WARFARE. 
 
This chapter will also look into other existing laws and approachesthat influence the 
regulation of cyber warfare.This chapter shall offer insight to the scalability of Cyber 




The Draft Articles on State Responsibility define countermeasures as “measures that 
would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis 
the responsible State, if they were not taken by the former in response to an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation and 
reparation.”97The customary international law of countermeasures governs how states 
may respond to international law violations that do not rise to the level of an armed attack 
justifying self-defense—including, implicitly, cyber- attacks. The international law of 
countermeasures provides that when a state commits an international law violation, an 
injured state may respond with proportionality.Some cyber-attacks that do not rise to the 
level of an armed attack nonetheless violate the customary international law norm of 
nonintervention.98These violations may entitle a harmed state to use countermeasures to 
bring the responsible state into compliance with the law. 
 
The Draft Articles provide that countermeasures must be targeted at the state responsible 
for the prior wrongful act and must be temporary and instrumentally directed to induce 
the responsible state to cease its violation.99Countermeasures under international law are 
however limited and obliged not to use force, as the principle of non -use of force as one 
of the seven principles of the UN Charter100Countermeasures should not violate human 
rights and ought to look into the interests of the people and not the state and thus reprisals 
against the wounded, sick,health forces, religious forces and civilians is banned.101 They 
are obliged not to violate Jus cogens norms102and  states ought to commit to peaceful 
                                                     
97 Draft Articles,supra note 99, ch. II, commentary, para. 1. 
98supraSubsection II.A.1.  
99 Article 48, Draft articlesupra note 99 article 49 
100 Article 2, UN Charter 1945 
101 Article 3, Geneva Conventions I-IV 1929 
102 Article 41, Draft Articles 
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settlement of disputes.103 
 
The most important countermeasures in this context are known as “active defenses’’. 
Active defenses attempt to disable the source of an attack and  passive defenses, by 
contrast, such as firewalls, purpose to repel cyber-attacks.104 
It is possible international norms will soon coalesce such that states have an obligation 
not only to refrain from committing cyber-attacks themselves, but also “not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”105 
 Hence, this history of state practice indicates that countermeasures are warranted against 
most cyber-attacks so long they comply with the relevant procedural requirements and 
the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
 
4.1.2 Tallin manual on cyber warfare 
 
Published in 2013, the Tallin Manual was a rulebook set to govern cyber warfare in 
international Law.The Tallinn Manual is not a binding legal document, nor does it 
propose future law, best practice or preferred policy.The views expressed in the Tallinn 
Manual are those of the expertsacting in their private capacity. The Tallin manual has 
thus far offered a considerable guide to Cyber warfare regulation despite of its incapacity. 
 
4.2 International legal regimes and institutions that directly or indirectly 
regulate cyber warfare 
 
4.2.1 United Nations 
 
There has been reportedly only limited U.N. action on the issue of cyber-security. The 
U.N. General Assembly has passed several related resolutions.106These resolutions, have 
                                                     
103 Article 50, Draft Articles 
104 DOD Strategy, supra note 14, at 7 
105 Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. Albania),I.C.J. Reports. 4, (1949) page 22.  
106 G.A. Res. 58/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/32 (Dec. 8, 2003); G.A. Res. 59/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/61 
(Dec. 3, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/45, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/45 (Jan. 6, 2006); G.A. Res. 61/54, U.N. Doc. 
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been claimed to be  vague and have not mandated any specific action by U.N. 
members.107 
Reportedly, the United Nations in July 2010, when government cyber-security specialists 
from fifteen countries collaborated met, submitted a set of recommendations to the U.N. 
Secretary-General as “an initial step towards building the international framework for 
security and stability that these new technologies require.108 
4.2.1 NATO 
NATO created two new NATO divisions focused on cyber-attacks namely the Cyber 
Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence.109This summit prompted the Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which calls upon 
members to “consult together” in cases of cyber-attacks, but does not bind them to 
“assist” each other, as would be required under Article 5.110 
 
4.2.3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“Cybercrime Convention”) through 
legislation and international cooperation promulgated “a common criminal policy aimed 
at the protection of society against cybercrime,” as the first international treaty on crimes 
committed using the Internet and other computer networks.111. The convention allows 
invited states to join the convention and thus the US ratified the Convention in 2006.112 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
A/RES/61/54 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/17 (Jan. 8, 2008); G.A. Res. 63/37, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/37 (Jan. 9, 2009); G.A. Res. 64/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/25 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
107  Resolutions on the Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical 
Informational Infrastructures, G.A. Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/58/199 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
 
108 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, at 4, U.N. Doc.A/65/201 (July 30, 2010). 
 
109 Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Two-and-a- Half Years Later: A Progress Report on Combating Cyber 
Attacks, J. INTERNET L. 5  
 
110 NATO Agrees on Common Approach to Cyber Defence, supra note 106.  
 
111 Council of Europe, ETS No. 185, Convention on Cybercrime, pmbl., Budapest (Nov. 23, 2001)  
112 Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Senate Ratifies Controversial Cybercrime Treaty, CNET NEWS, 




4.2.4 THE OAS 
The OAS approved a resolution in April 2004 stating that member states should “evaluate 
the advisability of implementing the principles of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime (2001)” and should “consider the possibility of acceding to that 
convention.”113 They further ratified the treaty in 2006. 
The OAS deployed an experts Group that would  “provide technical assistance to 
member states in drafting and enacting laws that punish cyber-crime, protect information 
systems, and prevent the use of computers to facilitate illegal activity.”114Although the 
OAS has made much progress in regional campaigns for cyber security it has done little 
for the world as a whole. 
4.2.5 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
In its Yekaterinburg Declaration, “the SCO member states stress the significance of the 
issue of ensuring international information security as one of the key elements of the 
common system of international security.” 115  The Organization demonstrated 











                                                     
113 Organization of American States IV(8), AG/RES. 2040 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 8, 2004),  
114see fig..1 table 
115 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Consulate General of Uzbekistan in New York City (July 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.uzbekconsulny.org/news/572/. 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There is no legal vacuum in the regulation of Cyber space law. Article 36 of Protocol I 
additional to the Geneva Conventions provides that, "in the study, development, 
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High 
Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in 
some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. However,Cyber operations 
that have been carried out thus far, for example in Estonia, Georgia and Iran, do not 
appear to have had serious consequences for the civilian population. International 
humanitarian law, or IHL, only comes into play if cyber operations are committed in the 
context of an armed conflict – whether between States, between States and organized 
armed groups or between organized armed groups. Therefore, we need to distinguish the 
general issue of cyber security from the specific issue of cyber operations in armed 
conflict. Terms like "cyber attacks" or even "cyber terrorism" may evoke methods of 
warfare, but the operations they refer to are not necessarily conducted in armed conflict. 
IHL does not specifically mention or define cyber operations. It has occasionally been 
argued that IHL is ill adapted to the cyber realm and cannot be applied to cyber warfare. 
However, the absence in IHL of specific references to cyber operations does not mean 
that such operations are not subject to the rules of IHL. If the means and methods of 
cyber warfare produce the same effects in the real world as conventional weapons (such 
as destruction, disruption, damage, injury or death), they are governed by the same rules 
as conventional weapons. 
The study proves to uphold the hypothesis that cyber warfare is inevitable war and that it 
falls beyond the scope of International Humanitarian Law. 
 
5.2 Conclusion  
The issue arises where a cyber attack does not rise to the level of an armed attack but 
nonetheless violate the customary international law norm of nonintervention. There is 
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only one cyberspace, shared by military and civilian users, and everything is 
interconnected. The key challenges are to ensure that attacks are directed against military 
objectives only and that constant care is taken to spare the civilian population and civilian 
infrastructure. The manual appropriately recalls in this regard that collateral damage 
consists of both direct and indirect effects, and that any anticipated indirect effect must be 
factored into the proportionality assessment during the planning and execution of an 
attack, a point highly relevant in cyberspace. Technology is a ‘living’ entity and is subject 
to change as years go by. The real difficulty with respect to the law and cyber warfare is 
not any lack of law but rather in the complexities that arise in determining the necessary 
facts, which must be applied to the law to render judgments. 116 These challenges 




5.3.1. Regulated countermeasures 
 
Countermeasures allow an injured state to respond to an attack with a reciprocal measure, 
with the goal of bringing an end to the war. Countermeasures provide states with a tool 
for addressing cyber- attacks that do not rise to the level of an armed attack but 
nonetheless violate the customary international law norm of nonintervention. 
 
For countermeasures too be effective they require the identity of the attacker and the 
computer or network from which the attack originates to be accurately identified. Second, 
the attacking agent must find the countermeasure costly—ideally costly enough to 
encourage lawful behavior. If the attacker can readily relocate its operations, as is often 
possible in the context of cyber-attacks, the countermeasure may not impose a significant 
cost on the actor responsible for the attack. For this reason, countermeasures are likely to 
be more effective against state actors and less effective against non- state actors. 117 
                                                     
116 Charles Dunlap Junior, Perspectives for Cyber Strategies on Law of Cyberwar, Strategic Quarterly 
Spring (2011) pg 81 
117 Oana Hathaway, Law of cyber attack, Yale Law School Legal scholarship, (2012) pg 47-76 




It is difficult to distinguish attackers from innocent individuals when conducting a 
countermeasure since it is difficult to contain the spillover effects. For this reason, the 
customary law of countermeasures offers only a partial answer to the problem of cyber- 
attacks.118 
 
5.3.2 Creation and Adoption of a Universal Treaty regulating all forms of Cyber 
warfare 
 
In the spirit of collective security and based on the principles of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of treaties, States should convene to draft a treaty which shall be binding 
upon ratification based on whether the State is monist or dualist. The treaty would 
possibly offer a consensus definition of Cyber warfare and set a foundational approach to 
dealing with the ambiguities of this new method of warfare such as what amounts to 
‘attack’ in cyberspace.The treaty should be informed not only by the principles of 
International humanitarian Law but should draw influence from other laws such as 
international human rights law, information technology law, international economic law, 
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